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CAUSALITY, DETERMINISM, AND THE MIND-BRAIN PROBLEM 
Jeffrey C. Schank 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
The problem of causality, determinism, and mind and brain are 
discussed, and new solutions are offered. To begin, a pragmatic struc-
turalism is assumed, asserting the functional equivalence of mind and 
brain activity. A problem-solving model of mind-brain activity is 
defined, employing the mathematical theory of probablistic automata. 
With this model it can be determined whether mind-brain activity is 
deterministic. This is accomplished if an adequate definition of strict 
causality is developed. Logical models of strict causality which define 
the causal relation in terms of "material implication" or "strict implica-
tion" are rejected. Causal relativity is assumed, and certain system-
theoretical assumptions are made with respect to the problem-solving 
model of mind-brain activity. Thus, strict causal structures are deter-
ministic if the etiologic relation "#" is representable by a function 
which is (1) irreflexive, (2) transitive, (3) asymmetric, and (4) tempor-
ally ordered. The representing function must be one-one or many-one, 
and "#" must be relativated to a model, L, and a domain, D. The 
results are, the representing functions of the models are not one-one 
or many-one, and thus mind-brain activity is indeterministic. But to 
avoid the result that mind-brain systems are chaotic in their behavior, 
the problem-solving model of mind-brain activity is given a game-
theoretical interpretation. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
The problems of causality, determinism, and mind and 
brain have occupied philosophers from the beginning of 
philosophical enquiry. This paper examines the activity of 
mind-brain systems and whether the activities of these systems 
are ordered by strict causal structures; thus, whether they are 
deterministic or indeterministic. It is argued that a solution to 
this problem requires a model of strict causality and a solution 
to the mind-brain problem which is methodologically prac-
tical. 
Many so-called solutions have been advanced to the mind-
brain problem (e.g. the identity of the material with the 
mental, various mind-brain dualisms, etc.) which are no 
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longer plausible since they are open to a number of serious 
objections, among them the following: 
The Beethoven symphony to which I am at the 
moment listening is not in one sense reducible to the 
mechanics of the score, nor of the recording, receiver, 
amplifier, and speaker system which is emitting it; 
nor is it completely described by the contortions set 
up in my auditory apparatus by the describable wave 
patterns impinging on my ears. All these and more 
are components - but something more than this con-
stitutes the symphony. This something more is not 
mystical. Musicians call it structure (Pribram, 1969). 
We must reach a similar conclusion with regard to the 
mind-brain problem; i.e., neither mental, phenomenal, or 
psychological descriptions on the one hand, nor material or 
physical descriptions on the other, are adequate to describe, 
for example, intelligence, memory, and imagination. Thus, a 
structural pragmatism is adopted. As Eddington (I959) 
pointed out, a structural pragmatism is a method which 
allows us to describe a structure without making a com-
mitment to the material or the mental. Further, structural 
pragmatism takes the difficult, but practical, approach that 
what is true about mind-brain activity must be established 
at each level (brain-activity and mind-activity), and that 
only then is such a structure valid (pribram, 1969). Now, 
the following thesis of Functional Equivalence is adopted: 
The activity of the mind (perception, memory, imagination, 
language, etc.) is functionally equivalent to the activity of the 
brain. 
To begin, therefore, the structure of mind-brain activity 
is defined as a problem-solving model. This is accomplished 
by employing the mathematical theory of finite probablistic 
automata. Once the structure of mind-brain activity is formal-
ly defined, we are able to determine whether the representing 
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functions of the models fulfill certain requirements of strict 
causality, and thus whether mind-brain systems are indeter-
ministic. But this, in turn, depends on finding a satisfactory 
definition of strict causality, a task to which we now turn. 
THE CONCEPT OF STRICT CAUSALITY 
Hume emphasized that the most important features of 
causality are contiquity, constant conjunction, and succession 
in time (Dormotor, 1972). Dormotor (I 972) pointed out the 
two most important questions with regard to the problem of 
causality. Q1: In a causal relationship, what are the entities 
usually referred to as causes and effects? Q2: With respect to 
the causal relation or causal operator which is either attrib-
uted to or associated with the causal entities, what kind of 
relation, operator, or something else is it? 
For the. purpose of Ql, we begin with certain entities 
called events, the exact nature of which does not matter now, 
but which will be determined later. Thus, for now what is 
important is that they belong to a set v which is non-empty 
and fixed. 
For the purposes of Q2 (Dormotor, 1972), the most 
natural steps to be taken are the following: (a) The causal 
relation is a binary relation, ++ defined on v. (b) The causal 
operator 'P is a mapping v -7 v with certain properties. (c) T 
is a fixed set of time instances structured by a before-after 
time ordering relation (, or if equality of time instances is 
included, then ~ is substituted for <. (d) For an event A e v, 
then A is a mapping from the time-set into the event-set A: T -7 V. 
(e) Step (d) does not make it clear whether an event does or 
does not occur, since it is merely a description. Thus, the 
predicate occurrence is introduced denoted by I~; e.g., A 
occurs at time t is denoted by l~tA. (f) The desirable properties 
of ++ and 'P, and the semantics controlling the correctness of 
these properties are the following: 
(1) -A ++ A (irreflexivity); 
(2) A ++ B -7 - (B +l> A) (asymmetry); 
(3) A ++ B & B +l> C -7 A ++ C (transitivity); and 
(4) As ++ Bt -7 S (t (time order). 
Logical Models of Strict Causality 
In this section some examples of logical models of causal-
ity are examined. In answer to Q1, the logical view holds 
(Dormotor, 1972) that the set v is a collection of well-formed 
formulas of a specific language. The answer to Q2, however, 
has been more difficult. 
Burks (1951) proposed the following definition of the 
causal relation: A +l> B = dfD (A -7 B) where 0, is an "empiri-
cal" or "physical" necessity operator, and where A, B e v. 
But as Dormotor (1972) showed, tautologies (e.g. A ~ A) 
lead to undesirable causal statements. And, formulas such as 
A +l> (A +l> B) if A +l> B, are true but have no empirical signifi_ 
cance. 
Czervinski (1960) attempted a perhaps more-realistic 
approach in defining the causal relation as: A ++ B = df (x), 
s(l~sAx -7 CU), t(s ( t) & lI-tBy). This says that an event, A, 
causes an other event, B, precisely when for an arbitrary 
object, x, if the associated A occurs at time s, then there will 
exist a later time, t, and perhaps another object, y, such that 
the associated B will also occur. But simple counter examples 
(Dormotor, 1972) arise, e.g., if l~tBy means that a person, y, 
will die at time t, then A +l> B is true when the time of death of 
y is substituted. 
Other logical models of causality have also been defined, 
but as Dormotor (1972) showed, these models also lead to 
similar undesirable consequences. 
System-Theoretical Definition of Strict Causality 
The problems that arise with the logical models of strict 
causality primarily result from defining causal structures as 
a universal relation, defined in terms of "strict implication" 
or "material implication." Causal relativity is, therefore, 
assumed. To accomplish this, a model is defined for the 
system to be examined making the following assumptions 
(system-theoretical): (a) A linguistic representational system 
(set-theoretic model) is an isomorphic or homomorphic 
system, mapping empirical structures (STRe) into set-theoreti-
cal structures (STRt): STRe ~ STRt, context or model L; and 
the axiomatization expresses the invariant (causal) inter-
dependencies. (b) Any representational linguistic system, 
which is a model of a theory has a domain of empirical refer-
ence, D. (c) Context- or theory-dependency and reference to 
a certain domain constitutes the context or theory-relativity 
of all invariant relations. (d) Structures consist of systems 
(Se, Re), where Se = Sl' S2"" ,S~ and Re = R1, R2""'~' 
(e) For the purpose of Q1, any change in a system is defined 
by a system event A, b, ... , Z, occurring at a certain time-
point. (f) The relations in any system are characterized by 
system events and relations obtained (or functions) can be 
either one-one or many-one functions (e.g., y = F(x», or 
one-many or many-many statistical functions (relations, 
e.g., E(y/x = ex + Bx + e. (g) Among the static or dynamic 
empirical structures are invariantly re-occurring empirical 
structures or systems events, if they belong to hierarchically 
independent systems, i.e. etiological systems (Leinfellner, 
unpublished manuscript, Invariance and causality) (In variance 
Thesis). 
It is clear that strict-causally invariant structures are 
deterministic in the strict sense (Leinfellner, unpublished) 
if the etiologic relation "+*" is representable by a function 
which is (1) irreflexive, (2) transitive, (3) asymmetric, (4) tem-
porally ordered, and if (5) the representing function is one-
one or many-one, and (6) "+*" is relativated to L (a model) 
and D (an empirical domain). 
MIND-BRAIN SYSTEMS AND CAUSAL STRUCTURES 
The mathematical theory of finite-probablistic-automata 
(FPA) is employed to define models of mind-brain activity. 
These models fulfill the system-theoretical assumptions made 
in the previous section. Nevertheless, objections may be raised 
to application of models from the field of artificial intelli-
gence to that of natural intelligence. For example, Dreyfus 
(1972) set out the following objections: (a) such models do 
not account for phenomenal evidence, (b) they do not reflect 
the way people perform, and (c) they are ad hoc, lacking 
generality. But with respect to (a), phenomenal evidence is 
accounted for by assuming a pragmatic structuralism. Second-
ly, with respect to (b), as Pylyshyn (1974) points out, "There 
is no simple and obvious relation between level of performance 
and fidelity of simulation." Finally, with respect to (c), this 
is a relative matter. In this paper the attempt is made to define 
the most general processes in mind-brain organization, and 
although the models to be defined are not completely satis-
factory, this by no means invalidates the approach. 
Now it is hypothesized that the most important charac-
teristic of mind-brain activity is its problem-solving ability. 
Problem-solving is defined (Leinfellner, unpublished manu-
script, Invariance and causality) as the termination of a con-
flict. A conflict consists of open alternatives AI' A2, ... , An. 
Alternatives are events, situations, opinions, hypotheses, and 
ideologies. The termination of a conflict is accomplished by 
selecting one, or more than one, or a mixture of the alterna-
tives, AI' A2, ... , An' The solution is obtained by applica-
tion of criteria (e.g., evaluations, values, estimations, etc.) 
either one criterion (one-dimensional criterion) or multi-
dimensional criteria. This ability to solve problems has been 
shown to be characteristic of brain activity (Pribram, 1971; 
Schank, 1979), and is called intelligence. 
Further, it is hypothesized that fundamental to the 
problem-solving ability of mind-brain systems is representa-
tion, i.e., the representation of one process by another process. 
This fits well with recent research in brain physiology (e.g., 
Pribram, 1971) where convincing evidence is found that the 
process of representation is fundamental to brain organization. 
Moreover, this fits well with the view that language is crucial 
to problem-solving, and that language itself is a representa-
tional system. In order, therefore, to define a problem-solving 
model of mind-brain activity, a computational method is 
defined for representation of one process by another. 
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The physiological function of the neuron is specified as 
the empirical domain of the problem-solving model to be 
defined. Thus to begin, a model of the physiological function 
of the neuron is defined, based on established hypotheses: 
i.e. (7) The primary function of the neuron is spike-generation; 
and (8) There is a random or unpredictable element acting in 
the spike-generation process. Moore, Perkel, and Segundo 
(1966) showed that (7) and (8) are well-established. They 
presented numerous studies showing that spike-generation 
occurs when the membrane potential exceeds a threshold. 
Further, Moore et al. (1966) found with regard to (8) that the 
random element acting in spike-generation was the result of 
internal and/or extrinsic processes of the neuron. In support 
of (a), there are well-known and empirically established 
"noisy" processes of cellular function. For example, Fatt and 
Katz (1952) provided a theoretical justification of the fluc-
tuations in membrane potential attributable to thermal agita-
tion, and the probablistic character of neuronal excitability 
was shown by numerous studies (Moore et al., 1966). Deter-
ministic expressions of the intrinsic spike-generation process, 
with the random aspect introduced by the random character 
of the input arriving at the neuron characterize (b). Models 
of this have been investigated recently by Harvey (1978). 
Furthermore, there is a theoretical justification for (8); 
that is, by drawing a distinction between two types of proba-
bility, i.e., reducible probabilities (e.g., a fair coin has the 
probability of 0.5 of coming up heads, but each individual 
event of tossing a coin is either "yes" or "no" with regard to 
its coming up heads) and irreducible probabilities which are not 
reducible in a "yes" or "no" manner (Leinfellner, unpublished 
manuscript, Invariance and causality). Arbib (1972) came to a 
similar conclusion: 
The most widely received interpretation of quantum 
mechanics takes this one step further by claiming 
that there are certain probabilities that are not 
resolvable even by making arbitrarily fine measure-
ments and that, in some sense, the action of the uni-
verse is inherently stochastic .... 
Many psychologists have studied learning tasks under 
the heading "stochastic learning theory" in a way 
which suggests the brain has two states - "task 
learned" and "task unlearned" - with nothing but 
random transitions to tie behavior together. Of 
course, the actual learning process in the real brain 
proceeds by numerous subtle changes-it is only the 
output which forces a binary value, masking the 
neural continuum. This is like the above situation in 
quantum mechanics, where the state of a system is 
now described by a function which contains informa-
tion about the probability distribution of results of 
measurement. ... In coming to describe the activity 
of the brain, we will have to evolve state-descriptions 
as alien to present-day psychological jargon as the 
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quantum state is to the classical position and velocity 
description of Newtonian physics. Of course, New-
tonian mechanics is perfectly adequate for a wide 
range of phenomena, and so may be much of conven-
tional psychology, but as our powers of observation 
become more sophisticated, so must the inadequacies 
of the classical approach become more apparent. 
In short, we assume that based both on empirical and theoreti-
cal grounds, there is a random or unpredictable element 
(i.e., an irreducible probability) acting in the spike-generation 
process of neurons which a model of the physiological func-
tion of the neuron, to be adequate, must incorporate. 
We are now able to define a model of neuron activity. 
This model incorporates the features of the McCullock-Pitts 
model (in Arbib, 1964), with the addition of a random ele-
ment acting in the spike-generation process. The model em-
ployed here is taken from Arbib (1964), generalized to an 
FPA using the method of Suppes (1969), and incorporates a 
threshold (Lewis and Coates, 1967). 
Definition 1: The model of neuron activity is a 
structure N = ( I, 0, S; p, d >, if and only if, 
(i) I is a finite set such that 
(a) for each ij in I, ij there is a set of m inputs 
Xl' x2'···' xn 
(b) for .each Xi ~n ij there is an associated weight 
Wi' I.e., for mputs Xl' x2, ... ,xm there are 
weights WI' w2, ... , wm; 
(ii) ° is a finite set (the set of outputs); 
(iii) S is a finite set (the set of internal states); 
(iv) P is a function on the Cartesian product S X I 
such that for each s· in S, and i. in I, P . is a 
b bil·t d . IS· ) Sl pro a 1 y enslty over ,I.e .. 
(a) for each Sj in S, Psi(Sj);;' 0 
(b) l: S{S, Psi(Sj) = 1; 
(v) d is a function of the Cartesian product S X I 
such that for each s· in Sand i· in I d· is a 
. . . I ) . 'Sl probability denSity over 0, but If there is a 
threshold 8', there are two possibilities, i.e., 
n 
(a) if ~ w.x].;;;;, e, then 
J = 1 J 
(1) for each OJ in 0, ds/ OJ) ;;;;, 0 
(2) l:0{ 0, ds/ OJ) = 1, or 
n 
(b) if l: w.x). < e then j = 1 J ' 
(1) for each OJ in 0, dsi( OJ) = ° 
(2) l:o/ 0, dsi( OJ) = o. 
Further, N works on a discrete time scale, so that if at time t 
it is in state Sj and receives a set of input i· (i.e., xl' x2' ... ,X 
with associated weights WI' w2' ... , w~), then at time t + Y 
the probability that it has changed to state p(s., i.) is P ·(s.) 
and the probability that it emits output d(s., i.) is] d ~(o.) Sl J ]] Sl J. 
Mind-brain activity, however, is also characterized by, 
e.g., memory, imagination, and language. Pribram (1971) 
showed that fundamental to these mind-brain processes, from 
a brain physiological point of view, is the process of repre-
sentation. Thus, if a network of formally defined neurons 
(FPAN) is a representation network, it can be defined as an 
FP A. That is, let the FP AN net M have m FP ANs, n input 
lines, and r output lines. The input of the net is known when it 
is known which of the input lines are on and which are off: 
The state of the net is known at a time, t, if it is known which 
of the FP ANs are firing and which are not firing at time t. 
Thus Q denotes the set of states, !c,. denotes the set of inputs, 
and n denotes the set of outputs of the net M. The firing of an 
FPAN of M at time t + 1 is probablisticaly determined by the 
firing pattern of the FP AN's inputs at time t, and thus is a 
probablistic result of the state and input of the whole net M 
at time t. Therefore, a representing network of FPANs is 
generalized to a representation automaton (FPAR). The model 
is taken from Knouth (1968) (who considered the problem 
of how the equivalence between algorithms may be estab-
lished), and generalized to an FPA by the method of Suppes 
(1969). 
Definition 2: The model of a computational 
process for systems of FPANs is a structure R = 
(Q,!c,., n; 0, if and only if, 
(i) Q is a finite set (the set of internal states); 
(ii) !c,. is a finite set (the set of inputs) such that 
!c,.CQ; 
(iii) n is a finite set (the set of outputs) such that 
nCQ; 
(iv) f is a function on the Cartesian product Q X Q 
such that for each qi in Q, f is a probability 
d · Q . q ensltyover ,I.e., 
(a) for each qj in Q, fq(qj);;;' 0 
(b) ~q{ Q, fq(qj) = 1 and such that 
(c) f leaves S1 set -wise fixed. 
Further, R works on a discrete time-scale, so that if at time t 
it is in state qj' then at time t + 1 the probability it is in state 
qi is fq such tliat it leaves S1 set-wise fixed. 
Now as Knouth (1968) pointed out, if (i) - (iv) are ful-
filled, then process C2 = <Q2' "'2' S1?; f2> represents Cl = 
< Q l' "'1' S1 1 ; f 1 >if there are functions (statistical in this case): 
g from "'I into "'2; h from Q1 into Q2 taking S12 into S1 1; 
and j from Q2 into L (where L is a language). 
Moreover, as pointed out earlier, if we are to have an 
adequate model of mind-brain activity, it should be a prob-
lem-solving model. It was hypothesized that the process of 
representation is fundamental to problem-solving. The impor-
tance of language, memory, imagination, and perception to 
the problem-solving activity of mind-brain systems is obvious 
from the above definition of problem-solving. Thus, a model 
of problem-solving of mind-brain systems should be defined 
such that representational systems are incorporated (e.g., 
memory, language, imagination, etc.). This is fulfilled by a 
system of FP ARs generalized to a problem-solving automaton 
(FPAP). An FPAP is regarded as a "black box" which can 
accept any of a finite number of internal states and which can 
emit any of a finite number of outputs. These requirements 
are expressed mathematically by a model (Arbib, 1964), 
generalized to an FPA by the method of Suppes (1969). 
Definition 3: The model of mind-brain activity is 
a structure P = < x, ~,Z; <;, W >, if and only if, 
(i) X is a finite set (the set of inputs); 
(ii) ~ is a fmite set (the set of outputs); 
(iii) Z is a finite set (the set of internal states); 
(iv) <; is a function of the Cartesian product X X Z 
such that for each zi in Z and ij in X, <;zi is a 
probability density over A, i.e., 
(a) for each Zj in Z, <;zi(Zj);;;' 0 
(b) ~ Z{ Z, <;zi(Zj) = 1; 
(v) W is a function on the Cartesian product X X Z 
such that for each zi in Z and ij in X, wzi is 
a probability density over ~, i.e., 
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(a) for each OJ in ~,wzi(Oj);;;' 0 
(b) ~ Oj€~' wzi(Oj) = 1. 
Further, P works on a discrete time-scale, so that if at time t 
it is in state z· and receives an input ij , then at time t + 1 the 
probability tJat it has changed to state <;(Zj' ij) is <;zi(Zj) and 
the probability that it emits output W (Zj' ij) is wzi(Oj)' 
We can now easily show that FP AP is an indeterministic 
system. The representing functions of N = 0, 0, S; p, d> 
are defined as one-many or many-many statistical functions 
on both empirical and theoretical grounds. This, of course, 
violates (5) and thus we conclude that the etiologic relation 
"i+" is not a causal structure in the strict sense in such sys-
tems. Therefore, FPANs are indeterministic in their function. 
Further, the representing functions of R = <Q, "', S1; [) are 
defined as one-many or many-many statistical functions, since 
FP ANs are indeterministic systems. Thus (5) is violated, and 
hence FPAR is an indeterministic system. For similar reasons, 
the representing functions of P = <X, ~, Z; <;, w> are defined 
as statistical functions, violating (5), and thus FPAP is an 
indeterministic system. 
STABLE PROBLEM-SOLVING SYSTEMS 
In the preceding section, FP APs were found to function 
indeterministicly. But if FP APs function indeterministicly, 
this may result in certain undesirable consequences; e.g., the 
behavior of such systems may be chaotic. Thus, an interpreta-
tion is required which is both empirically grounded and avoids 
this undesirable consequence. 
If the model P = <X, ~, Z; <;, w> is interpreted game-
theoretically, it avoids the consequence that mind-brain sys-
tems (FP APs) are chaotic in their behavior. But what are the 
empirical grounds for this interpretation? One line of evidence 
comes from social biology. It is now widely known that a 
majority of genes (e.g., see Dawkins, 1976; Lorenz, 1966) 
are rule or behaviorally oriented; i.e., they predispose indi-
viduals to certain strategy mixtures. Another line of 
evidence comes from behavioral psychology, where it is estab-
lished that individuals acquire new strategy mixtures with 
regard to their environment (e.g., see Skinner, 1974). 
Using the method of KOhler (1974), I shall attempt to 
show that P = <X, ~, Z; <;, w) can be interpreted as definin~ 
a stable system of FP ARs. In order to accomplish this, it i~ 
shown that certain notions of game-theory correlate with P = 
<X,~, Z; <;, w>. 
We begin with a set of external states G~ which are rele 
vant to the behavior of all FPARs in the system FPAP at tim( 
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t, where m is the number of such states. It is assumed that 
there is at least a partial memory of relevant past-behavior 
or output of all FPARs in the system, so that this informa-
tion is either directly or indirectly obtainable by any FPAR 
in the system. Now we let In be the set of n FPARs and Yi 
be the strategy set of the ith FPAR. The strategy set includes 
all possible outputs that an FP AR might emit given the various 
external states of the set G~. The strategy set of the indivi-
dual FP ARs is determined either genetically or by interaction 
(learning) with the external states G~. But it is obvious that 
the strategy sets of FPARs cannot consist only of pure strate-
gies, but must also consist of mixed strategies. For example, 
consider an FPAR which is a perceptual system or a memory 
system; if the strategy set of such an FPAR consisted only of 
pure strategies, e.g., a pure strategy instructing such systems 
to accept or retain all information, then strategies such as 
these would of course lead to a "break-down" of the system as 
a whole. Thus, strategy sets of FPARs must contain mixed 
strategies. The set of probabilities describing the output of 
FPAR i is called a strategy mixture, designated by r1 which is 
a function of external state Gm at a time t. This can be stated 
more formally as: r1 is the m x n strategy mixtures at time t, 
viz. a probability for each FPAR; and external state k for each 
strategy YieY such that: 
rtm (Yi);;" 0 and rt (Yi) = 1. 
Now the state of the FPAR in which we are interested is 
the strategy mixture of its output; the input which guides the 
output is the state Yi Gm at that time. It is assumed that Gm 
is the same for all FP ARs of the system, and thus that all 
FPARs act on the same information about external states. 
Thus, since the external state Gm is taken as the input for the 
system as a whole, it corresponds to x. The internal state of 
the whole system is taken as the n-tuple of all n FPAR strategy 
mixtures at a time, t, viz. < ri, r~, ... , r~). The set of n-
tuples, therefore, corresponds to the set Z. 
But to interpret the set L requires an additional concept 
of game-theory, i.e., stability of a system (in this case a prob-
lem-solving system). This is defined formally as follows: F is 
the set of stable strategy Il'.ixtures and has the following 
property: 
With this concept we can say that the set L corresponds to the 
set F of stable strategy mixtures. 
We are left with representation functions <; and w which 
require interpretation. But to accomplish this, another concept 
of game-theory must be defined; that is, an important descrip-
tive property of problem-solving systems whose behavior has a 
certain minimal stability. This stability is such that all FPARs 
have certain fixed strategy mixtures genetically determined. It 
is assumed that the individual FP ARs, depending on their 
genetic predispositions, begin their activity predisposed to 
certain strategy mixtures. These mixtures are then changed 
to new mixtures according to information received and ac-
cording to other predispositions. Formally this is stated: 
pf is the m x n transition probabilities from the Cartesian 
Product Gt X rt to rt + 1 
mIl 
The individual probability functions pf do not correspond 
directly to the representation function <; because the latter 
yields probabilities of the internal states of the FP AP, whereas 
the former is a probability function only of an individual 
FPAR's internal state. What is needed is a probability of the n-
tuple of strategy mixtures which is the internal state of the 
system (this is what is needed to interpret <;). Therefore, 
a new probability function, Df, is introduced, which is deter-
mined by the Pi's, and is a function of < ri, r~, ... , r~). The 
set of these Di functions corresponds to the domain of the 
representation function <;, and thus for every n-tuple of 
strategy mixtures which holds for the system at a time, t, and 
for every state, there is a uniquely determined Df<r i + 1, 
t+l t+l 
r2 ' ... ,rn ). 
Only w is left to be interpreted, so we specify a function Hl which is determined by the individual FPAR rrobability' 
functions Pi' and is a function of < ri ' r~, ... , r n ). This Ht 
function is the same as Df function except that th~ uf is 
restricted by property, viz. rf € F ~ df (tit') (t") (t") t -+ l' (rl) = 1). Thus, ~ functions correspond w. 
CONCLUSIONS 
My conclusions are first that mind-brain activity defined 
as a finite probablistic automaton and given a game-theoretical 
interpretation is a new solution to the mind-brain problem. 
This model is general enough to incorporate the concepts 
of feedback and feedforward (pribram, 1971; Arbib, 1964). 
With these concepts of feedback and feedforward, it can be 
shown that mind-brain systems can evaluate, and with the 
addition of a memory system, mind-brain systems can eval-
uate with respect to time (Schank, 1979). Moreover, it can 
also be shown that statistical decision-making can be defined 
in this model of mind-brain activity, but that this does not 
exclude the inclusion of deterministic decision-making or 
logics since such logical systems are special cases of individual 
decision-making. 
Secondly, logical models of strict causal structures are 
inadequate. Strict causal structures obtain in a system, only 
if "#" is relativated to a model L where an empirical domain 
is specified and where the functions of L fulfill certain require-
ments (system-theoretical assumptions). In the three models 
defined the representation functions violated (5), and thus it 
followed that the etiologic relation "*" defined for mind-
brain systems is not causal in the strict sense, but is a causal 
structure, nonetheless, because it fulfills Hume's concept of 
causality formally stated by Dormotor (1972) and defined by 
Suppes (1970), viz., As * Bt = df s } t & P(Bt/As) } P(Bt). 
That says that an event A at a time s causes an event at a time 
t is equal by definition to s is before t and the probability of 
8t given As is greater than the probability Bt alone. But 
Suppes (1970) proved using the standard probability theory 
and the above definition, that (3) is violated. 
Finally, determinism was defined in terms of strict causal-
ity, but the representing functions defined in our model of 
the problem-solving activity of mind-brain systems violate 
(5); therefore, mind-brain activity functions indeterministicly. 
This is, of course, relevant to the free-will and determinism 
issue. Nevertheless, although indeterminism is essential to 
free actions and choices, it is not sufficient, since there may be 
coercion from outside the system. 
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